A week before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 I was in Helsinki talking to officials and experts about what I believed was the looming war. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, a pair of analysts at the Royal United Services Institute, a think-tank, had just published a paper titled “The Plot to Destroy Ukraine”. It included a map showing potential Russian invasion routes, five menacing arrows plunging into the country from Belarus, Russia and Crimea. Russia’s FSB, its domestic security service, and the VDV, its airborne forces, the paper warned, were preparing for an occupation and drawing up lists of potential Ukrainian dissidents to kill or detain.

It was a remarkable paper. And it was the first of many. Jack and his colleagues returned to Ukraine again and again, producing reports that documented the course of the war, the evolution of tactics, the changing nature of Russian weaponry and much else. The reports are read avidly in Western governments and intelligence services. They have appeared in my stories often.

I had therefore been keen to get Jack on Inside Defence and he makes a fitting final guest in London before I move to Washington, DC to take over as bureau chief there. When we met last week, both of us dressed down in the London heat, Jack had just returned from his latest trip to Ukraine. There is a general sense that the war has reached a turning point, with many Western analysts seeing Ukraine’s battlefield gains and deep strikes inside Russia as a cause for optimism. But Valery Zaluzhny, the former commander of Ukraine’s armed forces and now its ambassador in London, has dubbed this a “dangerous misreading”. I started my discussion with Jack by getting his perspective on where things stand and what has changed. Ukraine’s recruitment strategy, he told me, has undergone an important evolution. The country hasn’t solved its personnel problems. Far from it. Most Ukrainian units are still operating at 50% strength. But, while Russia’s recruitment crisis deepens, Ukraine has improved its ability to retain manpower and replenish its ranks, thanks to longer training periods, greater flexibility and better pay for soldiers, among other things. This is an encouraging, if fragile, shift. 

Jack and I also unpacked some counterintuitive battlefield truths. Yes, drones and other uncrewed technologies have transformed warfare (Jack shared fascinating reflections on the efficacy and expansion of combined-arms manoeuvres), but low-tech skills are still important. Digging, for instance, has become something of a lost art for many Western armies, but the ability to manually fashion underground dugouts is essential for Ukrainian troops’ survival, he explained. It’s a skill that Ukrainian soldiers have been teaching their British counterparts, too. And, when I asked him when progress in weapons technology would make soldiers redundant, he seemed relatively optimistic about their job security. Drone warfare is surprisingly manpower-intensive, as he explained in detail.

I then broadened our conversation to get Jack’s perspective on great-power competition. Does he think that the rules-based order is crumbling or dead? He argued that the old order is not going to be an effective mechanism for solving today’s problems. Rules and norms are still important, but they have to be new ones, rewritten for the times. Put differently, Jack thinks geopolitical sentimentalism is unhelpful. “You are denying yourself the opportunity to proactively shape the future because you’re too busy regretting the past.” 

I was also eager to get Jack’s guidance for my new role in Washington. What is his advice on understanding the American administration’s approach to the world? His response was clear-eyed. I recommend that you tune in on Tuesday to hear it. The discussion will be available to watch on-demand from 6pm London time (1pm in New York). As always, I’m interested to hear your feedback. Write to me at insider@economist.com.